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PROVIDING ADEQUATE REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF SOCIAL NETWORK CYBERBULLYING
I. INTRODUCTION
 On September 22, 2010, college freshman Tyler Clementi committed suicide 
after his roommate streamed a video of Tyler kissing another man.1 His story brought 
the issue of cyberbullying2 to the world stage, garnering intense news media coverage. 
Public figures, including President Barack Obama, Ellen DeGeneres, and Anderson 
Cooper spoke out against cyberbullying soon thereafter.3
 Two years later, in September 2012, after being harassed by a stranger online, 
fifteen-year-old Amanda Todd posted a video describing her experience of being 
threatened and bullied.4 Amanda hanged herself a few weeks later.5 The following 
1. Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. Times (Sept. 29, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html.
2. A number of definitions of “cyberbullying” exist. Social science definitions often start with three 
concepts: “intent to harm, imbalance of power and usually a repeated action.” Bobbie Mixon, Defining a 
Cyberbully, Nat’l Sci. Found. (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_
id=121847. Dictionary definitions include “the act of harassing someone online by sending or posting 
mean messages, usually anonymously.” Cyberbullying, Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/
browse/cyberbullying (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For the purpose of this note, cyberbullying is defined as 
the use of electronic communication to intentionally cause extreme harassment or embarrassment, beyond 
what a reasonable person in the victim’s position would expect. This narrow definition provides social 
networking platforms with a workable definition to help readily distinguish cyberbullying from harmless 
activity. See, e.g., Carrie Goldman, How Do I Know What’s Bullying and What’s Normal Conflict?, N.Y. 
Times: Motherlode (Oct. 10, 2014, 8:06 AM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/how-do-
i-know-whats-bullying-and-whats-normal-conflict (stating that bullying is distinguished from normal 
social conflict when three factors are present: repetition, unwanted aggression, and a power imbalance).
3. See Anderson Cooper’s Anti-Bullying Series: Too Many Kids Have Died Already, Huffington Post (Dec. 
7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/07/anderson-cooper-bullying_n_1000024.html; 
Mike Isaac, Obama on Twitter, Cyberbullying, the Internet: Play Nice, Forbes (Oct. 14, 2010, 8:16 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/velocity/2010/10/14/obama-on-twitter-cyberbullying-the-internet-play-
nice; Aliyah Shahid, Tyler Clementi: Video by Ellen DeGeneres, Speaks Out Against Teen Bullying, Alongside 
Abdul, Ciara, N.Y. Daily News (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:08 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
tyler-clementi-video-ellen-degeneres-speaks-teeny-bullying-abdul-ciara-article-1.191179. Following 
Tyler Clementi’s suicide, gay rights activist Dan Savage’s “It Gets Better” project grew in support and 
recognition. James Montgomery, Dan Savage Explains Why He Started ‘It Gets Better’ Project, MTV 
News (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.mtv.com/news/1649114/dan-savage-explains-why-he-started-it-
gets-better-project. Private citizens and public figures alike have created videos for the campaign to 
communicate to LGBT youth that “it gets better.” What Is the It Gets Better Project?, It Gets Better 
Project, http://www.itgetsbetter.org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
Among thousands of others, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, actress Anne Hathaway, and the 
staffs of Facebook and Gap Inc. have contributed videos for the project. Id.
4. See Ryan Grenoble, Amanda Todd: Bullied Canadian Teen Commits Suicide After Prolonged Battle Online 
and in School, Huffington Post (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/
amanda-todd-suicide-bullying_n_1959909.html. The video reports that a man on Facebook threatened 
Amanda Todd by demanding that she “put on a show” or he would disseminate an image of her showing 
her breasts on camera. Id. Todd’s video, titled “My Story: Struggling, Bullying, Suicide, Self Harm,” 
was viewed more than seventeen million times at the time of her suicide. The Top Six Unforgettable 
CyberBullying Cases Ever, NOBullying.com (Oct. 19, 2016), http://nobullying.com/six-unforgettable-
cyber-bullying-cases. 
5. See Rachael E. Ferrante, The Relationship Between Digital Assets and Their Transference at Death: “It’s 
Complicated,” 15 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 37, 60 (2013).
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year, twelve-year-old Rebecca Sedwick jumped to her death after two teenage girls 
sent her harassing messages online.6 Tyler’s, Amanda’s, and Rebecca’s tragedies reveal 
the horrific consequences of inadequately protecting online users against cyberbullying.
 Victims of cyberbullying currently have limited options for legal redress.7 They 
may bring criminal charges if the relevant jurisdiction has laws in place,8 or file a 
civil action against an individual aggressor, but only if they can identify the aggressor.9 
Redress options exclude filing suits against the online platform where the 
cyberbullying occurred. Significantly, social networking platforms,10 where arguably 
the most cyberbullying occurs,11 are immune from liability.12 As a result, the current 
legal landscape severely limits the parties a victim can hold accountable.
 The shortcomings of redress highlight two parts of the problem. First, victims of 
anonymous13 cyberbullying face the unmasking process, which can be challenging 
and expensive and may deter victims from seeking redress.14 Second, the current 
judicial interpretation of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)15 grants 
6. Stephanie Allen & Matthew Pleasant, Lakeland Girl Commits Suicide After 1½ Years of Being Bullied, 
Ledger (Sept. 10, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.theledger.com/article/20130910/news/130919963. 
Following Rebecca Sedwick’s death, one harasser posted on Facebook, “I bullied Rebecca nd [sic] she 
killed herself.” Josh Sanburn, A Florida Tragedy Illustrates Rising Concern About Cyber-Bullying Suicides, 
Time (Oct. 16, 2013) (alteration in original), http://nation.time.com/2013/10/16/a-f lorida-tragedy- 
illustrates-rising-concern-about-cyber-bullying-suicides.
7. See Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 Yale. L.J. Pocket 
Part 41, 41 (2007) (“Given its immediacy, anonymity, and accessibility, the Internet offers an 
unprecedented forum for defamation and harassment. The salient problem with such ‘cyberbullying’ is 
that victims are typically left without adequate recourse.”).
8. For more on state cyberbullying laws, see generally Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, 
Cyberbullying Res. Ctr., State Cyberbullying Laws (2016), http://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-
and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. A “social network” is defined as “a network of friends, colleagues, and other personal contacts” and “an 
online community of people with a common interest who use a website or other technologies to 
communicate with each other and share information, resources, etc[etera].” Social Network, Dictionary.
com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/social--network (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For the purpose of 
this note, “social networking platforms” refers to such networks operated via the Internet.
11. According to a 2012 McAfee survey,
93% of teens who have witnessed cruel behavior online say that [the] majority of cruel 
online behavior took place on Facebook. Furthermore half of teens have had a negative 
experience as a result of a social network site. Email was reported as one of the safest 
online activit[ies] with only 6.37% of teens reporting cruel behavior . . . .
 70% of Teens Hide Their Online Behavior from Their Parents, McAfee Reveals What U.S. Teens Are Really 
Doing Online, and How Little Their Parents Actually Know, Intel Security (June 25, 2012), http://
www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2012/q2/20120625-01.aspx.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. For the purpose of this note, “anonymous” includes pseudonymous and unidentifiable individuals.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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social networking platforms immunity against a victim’s claims.16 The resulting 
landscape cries for a workable solution.
 Scholars have recently identified several ways to provide victims better redress 
options.17 However, each option fails to specifically address social networking 
platforms, where the risk of cyberbullying is greatest.18 One proposal creates a single 
standard for courts to apply when deciding whether to compel an Internet company 
to disclose an anonymous user’s identity.19 Another proposal calls for Congress to 
amend the CDA by creating an exception to the blanket immunity that exists for 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs).20 Yet another proposal suggests implementing 
qualified notice-based liability for ISPs.21 This note proposes a process similar to 
notice-based liability but expands the focus to social networking platforms,22 
recognizing that as technology advances and new social networking platforms 
emerge, a clear shift in the legal landscape must occur.
 This note argues that an intertwining web of laws and precedent has eliminated 
virtually all avenues of redress available to victims of cyberbullying. The unmasking 
and immunity problems—eliminating adequate redress options—affect legal 
traditions, public policy, and society. First, by immunizing social networking 
platforms, the current legal landscape departs from established principles of third-
party liability.23 Second, platforms owe a self-made duty to protect users from offensive 
content, and by limiting victim redress to the individual aggressor the landscape 
disincentivizes platforms from upholding this duty.24 Finally, by eliminating 
accountability the legal landscape perpetuates the cyberbullying problem.25
 To mitigate these impacts and provide victims with sufficient redress, this note 
proposes a takedown process mirroring that of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA)26 that will work alongside the CDA to provide victims the opportunity 
to hold social networking platforms liable for failing to remove cyberbullying 
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also infra note 123 and accompanying text.
19. Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 Yale L.J. 320, 
363–64 (2008).
20. Cara J. Ottenweller, Note, Cyberbullying: The Interactive Playground Cries for a Clarification of the 
Communications Decency Act, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1285, 1288, 1326–30 (2007); see also infra Part III.
21. Areheart, supra note 7, at 43 –44.
22. It is imperative to independently address social networking platforms because of the amount of 
cyberbullying that occurs on such platforms. See supra note 11. Additionally, the unique nature of these 
platforms requires a specific approach to accountability. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
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content.27 This process carefully balances the need for victim redress with a user’s 
First Amendment right to speak freely, avoids overturning case law, works alongside 
the CDA, and embodies the fundamental values of § 230.
 A thorough review of why the problem exists as well as its challenges demonstrates 
why this proposal is the best solution. Following this Introduction, Part II explains 
how the redress problem came about. Specifically, Part II.A reviews the history of 
the unmasking problem and its burdens on victims seeking redress, while Part II.B 
focuses on the problematic legal landscape created by granting social networking 
platforms immunity. Part III addresses how the redress problem expands beyond 
victims to affect legal traditions, public policy, and society. Part IV describes current 
proposals to solve the problem and their shortcomings, and instead proposes a 
DMCA-like process that will better address a victim’s redress options. Part V 
concludes this note. Appendix A sets forth the language of the proposal in Part IV 
alongside corresponding provisions from the DMCA.
II.  THE PROBLEM: INADEQUATE REDRESS IN THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
 A. The Unmasking Problem
 The unmasking problem typically arises when the cyberbullying results from an 
anonymous aggressor. Since many social networking platforms allow users to remain 
unidentifiable, victims face a significant challenge to hold an aggressor liable.28 An 
overview of the unmasking process demonstrates this hurdle.
 The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that the First Amendment protects online 
speech,29 including an individual’s right to speak anonymously.30 However, this right 
is not unlimited.31 Plaintiffs may seek redress for harmful online speech made by 
anonymous users, but they must first learn the aggressor’s identity.32 This process, 
27. See infra Part IV and Appendix A.
28. Anonymity on social networking platforms provides individuals with the opportunity to speak without 
believing any consequence will result, thereby increasing the potential for cyberbullying. See Sameer 
Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Bullying Beyond the Schoolyard 20 (2009) (“Malicious words 
and statements that an individual might be ashamed or embarrassed to use in a face-to-face setting are 
no longer off-limits or even tempered when that person is physically distant from the target.”). However, 
as discussed herein, anonymity does not eliminate accountability because “individuals are not completely 
anonymous when interacting in cyberspace.” Id. at 21.
29. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
30. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to remain 
anonymous  .  .  . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (finding that requiring an author’s identity on handbills “would tend 
to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression”).
31. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1600 (2007) (“[T]he right is not absolute but must be balanced against plaintiffs’ 
interests in order to foster uninhibited public discourse.”); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (“The right 
to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct.”). 
32. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341, 353; Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D. Conn. 2008).
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known as unmasking, can be a lengthy back-and-forth task for plaintiffs.33 First, the 
plaintiff must subpoena34 the online entity to obtain the aggressor’s registration 
information or Internet Protocol (IP) address.35 If the online service provider provides 
the IP address, the plaintiff must then contact the appropriate ISP, usually by 
subpoena, seeking information linked to the IP address.36 Before responding to the 
subpoena, the ISP will attempt to notify the aggressor,37 who may then move to 
prevent disclosure of her identity.38 If the aggressor moves to prevent disclosure, or 
the ISP does not respond to the subpoena, the plaintiff must then file an order 
requesting a court to compel the ISP to respond to the subpoena.39
 Faced with a motion to compel disclosure of an anonymous aggressor’s identity, 
courts will balance the defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously 
against the plaintiff ’s right to seek legal redress.40 To strike this balance, courts 
commonly reference two judicially created tests: the Dendrite and Cahill tests. In 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, the New Jersey Superior Court set forth a 
33. The period between filing the subpoena and a court deciding a victim’s motion to compel discovery can 
take several months. See, e.g., Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Does 1–10, No. MC 11-00096-PHX-FJM, 
2011 WL 5335562, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2011) (deciding the plaintiff ’s motion to compel a website to 
comply with a subpoena sent to the website in May 2011, five months earlier).
34. A “subpoena” is “a writ commanding a person designated in it to appear in court under a penalty for 
failure.” Subpoena, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subpoena (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017). The verb form is defined as “to order someone to appear in court to give evidence.” 
Id. Subpoenas that seek a defendant’s identity are often referred to as “John Doe subpoenas.”
35. Gleicher, supra note 19, at 328. 
36. Id. This process is necessary because an IP address only provides the string of numbers identified with 
an individual computer, subject to change each time a user accesses the Internet, but the ISP still has 
access to the computer user’s contact information. Id. Because of the changing nature of information 
connected to an individual IP address, this may require the plaintiff to serve additional subpoenas on an 
ISP. Id.; Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth: Protections for 
Anonymous Online Speech, 13 J. Internet L. 1, 23 (2010) (“With the increased use of open networks 
and anonymizers, IP disguisers, MAC spoofing, and similar technological tools, the IP address sought 
by a plaintiff may not conclusively identify the anonymous speaker.”).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a) (2012) (requiring notice to ISP subscribers before the ISP may disclose the 
subscriber’s identity to a third party). There are policy and business reasons why an ISP would notify an 
alleged cyberbully before disclosing her identity. For instance, notifying the alleged cyberbully gives the 
individual the opportunity to file a motion to quash the subpoena so the ISP is not forced to disclose the 
information sought. See Frequently Asked Questions for Subpoena Targets, Electronic Frontier Found., 
https://www.eff.org/pages/frequently-asked-questions-subpoena-targets#prevent_disclosure (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017). Another reason is to protect the alleged cyberbully from fraudulent claims by 
putting her on notice. A third reason is that notice also gives the alleged cyberbully the opportunity to 
take matters into her own hands and settle the matter outside the judicial system.
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005) (“Doe filed an ‘Emergency Motion for a 
Protective Order’ seeking to prevent the [plaintiffs] from obtaining his identity from [the ISP].”).
39. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (providing 
guidelines to trial courts “when faced with an application by a plaintiff for expedited discovery seeking an 
order compelling an ISP to honor a subpoena and disclose the identity of anonymous Internet posters”).
40. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342, 353 (1995); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. 
Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D. Conn. 2008); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61.
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four-pronged test, requiring the plaintiff to support her claim with sufficient facts to 
withstand a motion to dismiss and a balancing of the parties’ interests.41 In Doe v. 
Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court altered the Dendrite test by dismissing it in part 
as unnecessary and adopting its first and third prongs: “the plaintiff must make 
reasonable efforts to notify the defendant and must satisfy the summary judgment 
standard.”42 Although the Dendrite and Cahill tests appear straightforward, courts 
have modified them haphazardly, which has unfairly burdened plaintiffs.43
 Since redress for cyberbullying is limited to the individual aggressor, and 
aggressors can remain anonymous on many social networking platforms,44 the 
unmasking process is often a part of a victim’s legal challenge.45 The haphazard 
nature of the courts’ standards creates uncertainty about what is sufficient evidence 
for an unmasking order. This uncertainty results in such a burden that a victim may 
be less likely to bring a case and, if so, makes it harder for a victim to win. To 
demonstrate this burden, the table below reflects how courts indiscriminately apply 
factors when deciding whether to compel disclosure46:
41. 775 A.2d at 760–61. In Dendrite, the plaintiff sought the identity of a user who pseudonymously posted 
comments on Yahoo!’s Dendrite bulletin board. Id. at 763. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that certain 
statements were false, defamatory, and misappropriated trade secrets. Id. The court articulated the 
following test: (1) the plaintiff must attempt to notify the anonymous user that they are subject to a 
subpoena and withhold action allowing the user to oppose the request; (2) the plaintiff must set forth 
the user’s exact statements; (3) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie cause of action against the user 
to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; and (4) assuming the plaintiff has established 
a prima facie cause of action, courts must balance the user’s First Amendment right against the strength 
of the plaintiff ’s case and the need for disclosure. Id. at 760–61.
42. 884 A.2d at 461. The Cahill court found that the remaining Dendrite test requirements were unnecessary 
because they are subsumed into the summary judgment inquiry. Id.
43. For detailed analyses of the haphazard standards applied by courts, and arguments for, or against, a 
uniform standard, see Gleicher, supra note 19, at 338–45; Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: 
Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 833, 847–59 
(2010); Sophia Qasir, Note, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations, 81 Fordham 
L. Rev. 3651, 3672–84 (2013).
44. For example, Instagram and Twitter users must create usernames, which may contain any number of 
letters, numbers, and certain symbols, leaving the user unidentifiable. Creating an Account & Username, 
Instagram Help Ctr., https://help.instagram.com/182492381886913 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017); 
Twitter, https://twitter.com/signup (last visited Apr. 6, 2017); see also Heather Kelly, Anonymous Social 
Apps Provide Forum for Gripes, Gossip, CNN (Feb. 28, 2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/28/
tech/social-media/secret-social-apps (discussing new social networking platforms that allow users to 
register and post content anonymously and the associated harms).
45. See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 36, at 16 (“[A] party seeking redress for injuries caused by [an 
anonymous user’s] post generally has no cause of action against the computer service itself, but only 
against the poster. As such, the discovery of the poster’s identity is essential to pursuing a claim.”).
46. This table is adopted from Gleicher, supra note 19, at 343. It identifies five factors courts consider and 
specifies those considered in leading cases: (1) whether there was notice to the defendant and an 
opportunity for her to respond anonymously, id. at 345; (2) the strength of the plaintiff ’s claim, that is, 
whether the claim meets standards of good faith, ability to survive a motion to dismiss, ability to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, and ability to establish a prima facie case, id. at 350; (3) 
whether information a plaintiff seeks has “some degree of relevance to the plaintiff ’s case,” id. at 357; (4) 
the plaintiff ’s level of specificity in making a claim, id. at 359; (5) a balancing of the interests of the 
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(1999)47 X X X
In re AOL (2000)48 X X X
Dendrite (2001)49 X X X X X
2TheMart.com 
(2001)50 X X X
Cahill (2005)51 X X
Mobilisa (2007)52 X X X
Krinsky (2008)53 X X
 Of the examples above, the Dendrite test, created by the New Jersey Superior 
Court, includes the most factors—notice, strength of the plaintiff ’s argument, 
relevance, specificity, and a balancing test—rendering it the most challenging for a 
victim to overcome.54 Alternatively, in every example, the court’s standard includes a 
review of the strength of the plaintiff ’s argument. The later cases—Cahill, Mobilisa, 
and Krinsky—show how this factor is one of only two or three considered.55
 Although it may seem that the fewer factors a victim must prove the lesser the 
burden, the opposite is true in unmasking cases. Absent a number of other factors 
bearing on a court’s analysis, courts following the framework of recent unmasking 
decisions are effectively forced to severely scrutinize the strength of a victim’s 
argument.56 The likelihood of success then heavily, if not entirely, rests on proving the 
plaintiff and the defendant, id. at 360; and (6) whether the plaintiff can “demonstrate that he has 
exhausted all other means to identify the defendant,” id. at 362.
47. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
48. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d sub nom. 
Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
49. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
50. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
51. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
52. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
53. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244–45 (Ct. App. 2008).
54. See Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet Defamation, L.A. 
Law., Oct. 2001, at 19, 21 (calling Dendrite “[t]he strictest test to date” for Internet defamation claims).
55. See Gleicher, supra note 19, at 343.
56. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“The 
complaint and all information provided to the court should be carefully reviewed to determine whether 
plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named anonymous defendants. 
In addition to establishing that its action can withstand a motion to dismiss  .  .  .  , the plaintiff must 
produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior 
to a court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant.”).
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claim will survive a motion to dismiss, thereby heightening the demand on a victim to 
plead her case with sufficient evidence.57 This increased demand is further complicated 
by the uncertainty of what evidence a court will find sufficient to satisfy this factor,58 
burdening the victim to prove any and all arguments, and provide any and all evidence, 
that could tip the balance in her favor. If insufficient, Part II.B explains how the 
current interpretation of § 230 of the CDA then leaves victims without redress.
 B. The Immunity Problem
 Whether or not a victim of cyberbullying knows an aggressor’s identity, the 
current legal landscape diminishes a victim’s ability to hold any party other than the 
individual aggressor accountable. First, § 230 of the CDA immunized online 
platforms from liability for unlawful user-generated content.59 Then, courts expanded 
this blanket immunity to cover social networking platforms. However, upon closer 
examination, this interpretation is over-inclusive and improper. As a result, courts 
have erroneously immunized social networking platforms, limiting available redress 
for cyberbullying victims.
 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Corp., a supreme court in New York 
held Prodigy, an ISP, liable for defamatory statements posted by third parties on its 
online bulletin board.60 Congress passed § 230 of the CDA one year later in large part 
as a response to the Stratton Oakmont decision,61 “to remove the disincentives to 
selfregulation” that it imposed.62 According to Congress, § 230 was intended to 
57. See Gleicher, supra note 19, at 341–43 (stating how the standards set forth in Cahill, Mobilisa, and 
Krinsky “demand stronger showings of plaintiffs,” id. at 343, than those set forth in Seescandy.com, In re 
AOL, Dendrite, and 2TheMart.com).
58. While the court may adopt the summary judgment standard from Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760, it may 
modify this standard because the standard can be “confusing and varie[s] between jurisdictions.” 
Gleicher, supra note 19, at 343; see also Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244 (“We find it unnecessary and 
potentially confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment or motion to dismiss, to 
the showing required of a plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker on the Internet.”). 
Therefore, absent existing case law in the relevant jurisdiction, a victim should set forth information to 
satisfy Dendrite’s rigorous standard, even though the court may choose to adopt a lesser standard.
59. See infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
60. 1995 WL 323710, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133, 138–39 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)).
61. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of [§ 230] is to 
overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers 
and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to 
objectionable material.”).
62. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Fearing that the specter of liability 
would therefore deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress 
enacted § 230’s broad immunity ‘to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material.’” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4))).
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promote the freedom of the Internet,63 and included significant “Good Samaritan” 
protections.64 These protections state that “interactive computer service[s]”65 are not 
treated as publishers or speakers of content, and cannot be liable for taking good faith 
actions to remove or restrict access to objectionable content by third-party users.66
 One year after Congress adopted § 230, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. interpreted its provisions to grant immunity 
to “a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.”67 
Zeran’s claims stemmed from messages an anonymous user posted on an America 
Online (AOL) bulletin board.68 The messages advertised t-shirts bearing offensive 
slogans related to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and directed anyone interested 
in buying a shirt to call “Ken” at Zeran’s home phone number.69 As a result, Zeran 
received death threats and angry phone calls, which increased after a radio station 
reported the story and urged listeners to call.70 Zeran sued AOL, an ISP, in part for 
its delayed removal of the defamatory messages.71 The Zeran court, interpreting § 
230 of the CDA, granted AOL immunity for the defamatory postings by the 
anonymous third-party user.72
63. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation[.]”).
64. Id. § 230(c).
65. The statute defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, 
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated 
or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” Id. § 230(f)(2).
66. Id. § 230(c). The section reads in full: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material.
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker: No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to 
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or 
make available to information content providers or others the technical means to 
restrict access to material described in [subparagraph (A)].
 Id.
67. 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 329.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 328.
72. Id. 
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 Courts have applied Zeran to extend CDA immunity to social networking 
platforms. For example, in Doe v. Myspace, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that § 230 immunized Myspace, a social networking platform, 
from liability for a Myspace user’s sexual assault of a plaintiff ’s thirteen-year-old 
daughter.73 Though the court acknowledged the challenge Zeran’s interpretation of § 
230 places on a victim seeking redress, it reiterated the Zeran court’s finding that 
victims have other recourses against the content creator.74
 Subsequently, courts have followed Myspace and extended § 230 immunity to 
social networking platforms. For example, in Gaston v. Facebook, Inc., the U.S. 
District Court of Oregon applied § 230 to immunize Facebook from the plaintiff ’s 
defamation claim.75 Without much analysis, the court stated that the defendants—
Facebook, Google, and Lexis Nexis—“clearly fall within [the] definition” of 
“interactive computer service” for § 230 immunity.76 Similarly, in Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Facebook 
immunity against the plaintiff ’s assault and negligence claims.77 The court found 
that “[r]estricting a defendant’s liability as an information content provider to 
information actually created or developed by the defendant . . . is in keeping with the 
stated policy of the CDA.”78
 The Myspace, Gaston, and Klayman decisions help demonstrate the problem created 
by the Zeran court: “[B]y setting a precedent that the [CDA] bars all defamation claims 
for content posted by third parties,” social networking platforms receive absolute 
73. 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). Additionally, the court refused to accept the plaintiffs’ later argument 
that Myspace’s activity placed them outside § 230 immunity because Myspace “was partially responsible 
for creating information exchanged between” the victim and the user. Id. at 422. The court did not 
consider this argument because the claim was not presented to the district court, thereby barring the 
plaintiffs from raising the argument on appeal. Id.
74. Id. at 419 (“[T]hey may sue the third-party user who generated the content, but not the . . . service that 
enabled them to publish the content online.”); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“None of this means, of 
course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would escape accountability.”).
75. No. 3:12-cv-0063-ST, 2012 WL 629868, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 2, 2012). Specifically, the plaintiff claimed 
that the defamatory statements posted online forced him into bankruptcy, to quit law school, to live out 
of his car, and resulted in the denial of “relationships and anything he applie[d] for.” Id. at *3 (citation 
omitted). These claims mirror those often asserted by victims of cyberbullying. Dictionary definitions of 
“defamation” include “the act of defaming; false or unjustified injury of the good reputation of another, as 
by slander or libel; calumny.” Defamation, Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/
defamation (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For defamatory statements described in the cyberbullying context, 
see infra note 90.
76. Gaston, 2012 WL 629868, at *7.
77. 910 F. Supp. 2d 314, 321 (D.D.C. 2012).
78. Id. Although the court relied on Blumenthal v. Drudge to support its reading of the CDA, id. at 320–21, 
the Blumenthal court heavily relied on Zeran’s interpretation of the CDA’s immunity provisions. See 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50–52 (D.D.C. 1998).
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immunity.79 While cases exist where a platform was not immune under the CDA, such 
cases are often distinguishable from those brought by victims of cyberbullying.80
 Judges are not blind to the perverse implications of Zeran. In Grace v. eBay, Inc., 
the California Second Division Court of Appeal recognized that if ISPs are immune 
from distributor liability and publisher liability, as suggested by Zeran, ISPs need not 
fear liability and have no incentive to develop filtering and blocking technologies or to 
monitor for malicious content.81 Despite judicial awareness of the pitfalls of Zeran, the 
decision has continued to singlehandedly eliminate all avenues of redress for victims 
beyond the individual aggressor, whether or not the aggressor can be identified.
 The Zeran decision itself exemplifies how victim redress is nearly impossible. 
First, Zeran faced the burdens of the unmasking process described in Part II.A. 
Specifically, he claimed that he could not bring any action against the individual 
aggressor because “AOL made it impossible to identify the original party by failing to 
maintain adequate records of its users.”82 Faced with the inability to hold his aggressor 
accountable, Zeran brought a separate defamation action in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma against the radio station that further publicized 
the information.83 The radio station moved for summary judgment and the court 
granted the motion. The Tenth Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision to grant 
summary judgment on several grounds, including that the talk show host’s failure to 
verify the authenticity of the Internet posting did not meet the standard of 
recklessness.84 Like many victims, Zeran lost any chance of redress—his aggressor 
was unidentifiable and the judiciary denied his claims against the remaining parties.
 An additional problem with Zeran is the over-inclusive and improper interpretation 
of § 230. First, the Fourth Circuit found that § 230 grants immunity to “publishers” 
of information and “distributors” of information.85 However, the CDA removes 
79. Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1320.
80. See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the CDA did 
not grant Facebook immunity). In Fraley, the plaintiffs sued Facebook for misappropriation of their 
names, photographs, and identities in paid advertisements in Facebook “Sponsored Stories.” Id. at 790. 
The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that “Facebook contributes, at least in part, to the 
creation or development of the Sponsored Stor[ies],” and denied Facebook’s motion to dismiss under § 
230 immunity. Id. at 801–03. Under this framework, a victim must show that the social networking 
platform assisted in the creation of the cyberbullying material.
81. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 201 (Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he total elimination of distributor liability under Zeran 
would eliminate a potential incentive to the development of [filtering] technologies, that incentive being 
the threat of distributor liability.”).
82. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997).
83. Zeran v. Diamond Broad. Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1251–52 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (claiming that after 
the radio station broadcast regarding the AOL post, Zeran received an increased number of calls, 
including death threats, resulting in sleep deprivation and anxiety), aff ’d, 203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000).
84. Zeran, 203 F.3d at 720. Additionally, the court remanded the case to consider whether the station 
should receive its costs. Id. at 722–23.
85. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. 
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liability from a “publisher or speaker,”86 and explicitly omits the term “distributor.”87 
In addressing this omission, the court disagreed with Zeran’s argument that AOL is a 
distributor, not a publisher.88 The court concluded that the CDA forecloses distributor 
liability, asserting that distributor liability is a subset of publisher liability for the 
purpose of defamation law.89
 This interpretation is inconsistent with well-established common law principles 
of defamation liability. Like Zeran, victims of cyberbullying share similar defamation 
claims.90 In defamation actions, courts identify three levels of liability by the 
corresponding degrees of an entity’s control over content.91 Specifically, publishers 
(of newspapers and books, for example) may be held strictly liable for disseminating 
defamatory content; distributors (such as booksellers and libraries) are subject to 
notice-based liability; and common carriers (such as telephone and cable companies) 
are not liable for defamatory content.92 Such degrees of liability are deeply embedded 
in U.S. jurisprudence,93 and case law dating back to the nineteenth century.94 
However, by grouping distributors with publishers for § 230 immunity, the Zeran 
court ignored this framework and made it nearly impossible for any entity—publisher, 
distributor, or common carrier—to face liability for defamatory or offensive content.
86. The relevant provision reads, in part, “[n]o provider  .  .  . of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
87. “[T]he placement of ‘speaker’ alongside ‘publisher’ suggests that Congress meant for the [CDA] to 
eliminate only primary publisher liability for ISPs, but to keep distributor liability intact.” Ottenweller, 
supra note 20, at 1316 (emphasis added).
88. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 –32 (rejecting the plaintiff ’s argument that ISPs are normally considered to be 
distributors).
89. Id. at 332. 
90. See Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1296–97. Defamatory statements include “false statements [that] are 
posted and published for the sole purpose of harming the reputation of a fellow classmate or peer.” Id. 
at 1297.
91. Paul Ehrlich, Note, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 401, 403 (2002). 
92. Id. The entity’s control over content indicates the level of liability it may face. Id. Publishers face the 
greatest liability because of their ability to control the final content; distributors face liability only if 
there is evidence that they knew or should have known of the content and failed to remove it because 
they only control content through delivery or transmission; finally, common carriers do not face liability 
because they merely “transmit information mechanically with no opportunity to review its content.” Id.; 
see also Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1297–98.
93. See Hoover v. Peerless Publ’ns, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“[T]he black-letter rule 
[states] that one who republishes a libel is subject to liability just as if he had published it originally, even 
though he attributes the libelous statement to the original publisher, and even though he expressly 
disavows the truth of the statement.”).
94. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Times Publ’g Co., 40 A. 864, 865 (1898) (“As a publisher of news and items of public 
importance the press should have the freest scope, but as a scandal monger it should be held to the most 
rigid limitation. If a man has not the right to go around to tell of charges made by one against another, 
much less should a newspaper have the right to spread it broadcast and in enduring form.”). 
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 This over-inclusive reading of § 230 becomes even more problematic in the 
context of social networking platforms and their unique operations. Unlike publishers, 
distributors do not affirmatively exercise control over content and thus receive the 
lesser notice-based liability.95 Generally, social networking platforms reserve the 
right to remove any content that does not meet their terms of use or to delete a user’s 
account for violations.96 Platforms do not control the substance of user-generated 
content, but typically employ individuals to retroactively review content and user-
generated notifications of offensive content,97 operating like distributors. By 
abolishing distributor liability, Zeran leaves the original content creator as the only 
person who can be liable.98 As a result, platforms receive immunity, even when one 
operates as a distributor and receives notice of the defamatory or cyberbullying 
material, which diverts from the long-established legal approach.99
 Additionally, grouping social networking platforms as publishers is fundamentally 
improper. Unlike traditional publishers, some platforms create content, thereby 
making § 230 immunity inapplicable.100 For instance, Facebook and Myspace provide 
new users with pre-made answers to questions.101 Accordingly, grouping such 
platforms as publishers under Zeran’s view of § 230 ignores these functions.
95. See Ehrlich, supra note 91, at 403.
96. See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, Twitter Help Ctr., https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311 (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017).
97. For examples of violation reporting and social networking platform review procedures, see Abuse & Spam, 
Instagram Help Ctr., https://help.instagram.com/165828726894770 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017); 
Community Guidelines, Tumblr, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/community (last modified June 23, 
2016); Report Something, Facebook Help Ctr., https://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594 (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017); The Twitter Rules, supra note 96. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter grant users 
nearly complete control over content they post and only remove content—exercising editorial control—after 
receiving reports from other users of content violations. See Nina Bahadur, Why Instagram Removed This 
Woman’s Picture, Huffington Post (May 20, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/20/
meghan-tonjes-instagram_n_5353804.html (reporting on Instagram’s removal of a video blogger’s image, 
which displayed her backside covered only by underwear, after Instagram received notice that the image 
violated the platform’s anti-pornography guidelines); Miguel Helft, Art School Runs Afoul of Facebook’s 
Nudity Police, N.Y. Times: Bits (Feb. 18, 2011, 8:50 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/art-
school-runs-afoul-of-facebooks-nudity-police (describing an instance when Facebook removed an image of 
an artistic drawing posted by the New York Academy of Art after receiving notice that the image violated 
the platform’s nudity guidelines, only to later claim that the removal was a “mistake” and re-post the image).
98. See Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of the Internet: A New Approach to Third-Party Internet 
Defamation, 31 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 79, 82 (2008) (“The results of the Zeran interpretation 
have been problematic. By abolishing distributor liability, usually the only defendant that can be held 
accountable is the original content creator. This outcome is particularly frustrating when the  .  .  . operator 
had an active role in posting the content or was otherwise acutely aware of the defamatory statement’s existence 
on its web space.” (emphasis added)).
99. Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1319–20.
100. See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801–03 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
101. On both Facebook and Myspace, users can choose from options when answering questions regarding 
their sex, relationship status, and other personal information. See, e.g., Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 
413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the claim that Myspace partially created the content at issue by 
facilitating a user’s profile creation and choosing the information users share publically via a questionnaire).
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 Contributing to user content distinguishes social networking platforms from 
ISPs, which receive immunity under the Zeran court’s interpretation of § 230.102 The 
grant of immunity to social networking platforms where the platform contributes to 
user content—although not necessarily in the cyberbullying context—conf lates 
social networking platform cases with ISP cases. As a result, subsequent courts 
improperly grant blanket immunity to platforms and erroneously limit a victim’s 
redress to the individual aggressor.
III.  THE IMPACT: PROBLEMS AND SCOPE OF REDRESS LIMITATIONS
 While the challenges of unmasking a cyberbullying aggressor burdens a victim 
seeking redress from the aggressor, the application of CDA immunity eliminates the 
prospect of seeking relief from the platform on which the cyberbullying occurred. 
These two redress problems affect not only the victims of cyberbullying, but also 
legal traditions, public policy, and society. First, immunizing social networking 
platforms departs from established legal principles of third-party liability. Second, 
platforms owe a duty to protect users from offensive content, and by limiting victim 
redress to the individual aggressor the landscape creates a disincentive to upholding 
this duty. Finally, granting platforms immunity removes incentives for platforms to 
effectively combat cyberbullying, thereby facilitating the problem.
 Under the current approach, CDA immunity impedes a victim’s ability to hold a 
third party liable for the unlawful acts of another, departing from a principle 
recognized in other areas of law. For example, intellectual property law recognizes 
secondary liability for copyright and trademark infringement.103 Generally, secondary 
liability requires showing that the third party knew or should have known of the 
direct infringer’s activity,104 and willful blindness rarely excuses liability.105 Vicarious 
liability in this context stems from the agency doctrine of respondeat superior,106 
102. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting § 230 to grant immunity for 
the exercise of the “editorial and self-regulatory functions” of a service provider).
103. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“Although ‘[t]he Copyright Act does 
not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,’ these doctrines of secondary 
liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law.” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984))).
104. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 860 (1982) (“[A] finding of contributory 
[trademark] infringement requires proof of either an intent to induce illegal substitution or continued 
sales to particular customers whom the manufacturer knows or should know are engaged in improper 
palming off.” (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924))); Gershwin 
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (articulating the 
vicarious liability test for copyright infringement as “even in the absence of an employer-employee 
relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity 
and also has a direct financial interest in such activities” (emphasis added)).
105. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“To be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.” (citing 
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989))).
106. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260–62 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying vicarious liability 
to copyright infringement by third-party venders). For “respondeat superior” defined, see infra note 108.
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applied in both tort and criminal law107 to determine employer liability for acts by an 
employee.108 This doctrine dates back to the sixteenth century,109 and vicarious 
liability for copyright infringement traces its roots back to the early twentieth 
century.110 In contrast to intellectual property, tort, and criminal law, the landscape 
of CDA immunity departs from the lengthy history of third-party liability.
 Law professors Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner identify two factors that 
traditionally warrant third-party liability: control and activity-level.111 Liability is 
warranted when one party is able to “control” another party’s bad acts, and when 
liability may serve to motivate a party to account for her “activities” in light of the 
negative effects they may have.112 At a minimum, social networking platforms satisfy 
the control factor because of their ability to instantly remove cyberbullying content or 
delete a user’s account for violations.113 Accordingly, it is logical to hold platforms 
accountable when their operations satisfy at least one of these two factors. Wrongfully 
granting them immunity under § 230 then obstructs a victim’s redress options and 
departs from well-settled legal traditions.
 Eliminating platform accountability also creates bad public policy. Platforms are 
aware that users post unauthorized content, and many platforms therefore establish 
community standards for what kind of content users can and cannot post. For 
instance, Facebook and Instagram forbid discriminatory and hateful speech.114 
Violations are so widespread that many platforms even review certain content before 
it is posted.115 As a result, platforms have established a self-made duty to protect 
107. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 827 n.1 (Pa. 1959) (discussing the application of respondeat 
superior in the criminal context for the charges at issue, as compared to its application in tort law).
108. See Jeffrey S. Nowak, Note, Employer Liability for Employee Online Criminal Acts, 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 
467, 471 (1999) (“The traditional basis for an employer’s liability for its employees’ acts is the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, under which the employer is liable for employee acts that are within the scope of 
employment or in furtherance of the employer’s interest.”).
109. See Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation for 
Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. Rev. 570, 573–74 (1994).
110. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (holding that a film production company was liable 
for copyright infringement when it distributed a film based on the content of a book to free lancers who 
executed the work); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding 
that a department store was vicariously liable when a record concession within the department store 
infringed on phonograph record copyrights).
111. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 
221, 230–33 (2006).
112. Id. at 230 –31.
113. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
114. Community Standards, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017); Terms of Use, Instagram Help Ctr., http://instagram.com/legal/terms (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017).
115. For example, Grindr, a social dating platform for gay men, reviews a user’s profile photograph for nudity 
before it is made public. See Grindr Profile Guidelines, Grindr, http://grindr.com/profile-guidelines 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Additionally, Instagram removes users’ ability to search hashtags it deems 
inappropriate; for example, hashtags that promote self-harm such as “probulimia” and “proanorexia.” 
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users from offensive content, and some have even created anti-cyberbullying 
campaigns.116 Therefore, eliminating accountability is illogical and would serve as a 
disincentive for platforms to protect users from cyberbullying content.
 Platform immunity is also unjust because of the vast resources available to many 
social platforms that could address cyberbullying content. Facebook, for example, is 
estimated to be worth $350 billion.117 Social networking platforms employ large 
numbers of individuals: Recent statistics show that Facebook employs over 17,000 
people118 and Twitter employs over 3,800 people.119 Moreover, these platforms pay 
large amounts in damages to plaintiffs in successful suits.120 Thus, social networking 
platforms could easily relocate a fraction of their resources to input monitoring 
mechanisms that combat cyberbullying, ultimately placing them in the best position 
to make a victim whole.
 Finally, immunizing social networking platforms affects all of us by perpetuating 
the cyberbullying problem. Immunity allows platforms to ignore removal requests for 
cyberbullying content, forcing victims to “endure the embarrassment or avoid using the 
Internet altogether in an effort to remain psychologically healthy.”121 The dangers are 
widespread and the harm is real. In December 2016, Facebook reported an average of 
1.23 billion daily users,122 while a 2016 survey of over 5,000 middle school and high 
school students in the United States found that nearly thirty-four per cent of students 
between the ages of twelve and seventeen claimed to have experienced cyberbullying.123 
In the aftermath of Tyler Clementi’s, Amanda Todd’s, and Rebecca Sedwick’s 
suicides,124 the problem remains so vast that scholars Sameer Hinduja and Justin W. 
Instagram’s New Guidelines Against Self-Harm Images & Accounts, Instagram: Blog (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://blog.instagram.com/post/21454597658/instagrams-new-guidelines-against-self-harm-images. 
However, this should not affect the argument supra Part II.B that platforms qualify as distributors 
because in the Grindr and Instagram examples, the platforms do not control the substance of the final 
post (as a newspaper would). They merely ensure that content meets certain guidelines.
116. E.g., Put a Stop to Bullying, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/safety/bullying (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017).
117. Paul R. La Monica, Facebook Worth $1 Trillion? Not So Crazy, Cnn Money (July 21, 2016, 2:13 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/21/investing/facebook-stock-trillion-dollar-market-value.
118. Company Info, Facebook Newsroom, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017).
119. About, Twitter, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
120. For example, in Fraley, the court required Facebook to pay the class $20 million. Fraley v. Facebook, 
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943–44 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff ’d sub nom. Fraley v. Batman, 638 Fed. App’x 
594 (9th Cir. 2016).
121. Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1326; see also Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 Md. L. Rev. 
501, 539 (2013) (“When anonymity allows perpetrators to escape detection, harms go unredressed and 
the aggregate incidence of harmful behavior increases.” (footnote omitted)).
122. Company Info, supra note 118. 
123. Justin W. Patchin, 2016 Cyberbullying Data, Cyberbullying Res. Ctr. (Nov. 26, 2016), http://
cyberbullying.org/2016-cyberbullying-data.
124. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
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Patchin created the term “cyberbullicide” to describe suicide that occurs as a result of 
online victimization.125 Furthermore, Facebook recently formalized its suicide 
prevention efforts with a new feature that allows users to report potential instances of 
self-harm directly from another user’s post.126
 Upon notice of alleged cyberbullying, platforms are able to decide whether to remove 
the objectionable content. The longer the post exists, the broader its dissemination and 
the greater the harm to the victim.127 Accordingly, Part IV proposes a solution that 
incentivizes platforms to expeditiously respond to cyberbullying or risk liability.
IV.  THE SOLUTION: A DMCA-LIKE PROCESS FOR REDRESS
 Scholars have recognized a victim’s challenge to gain redress as well as the 
problematic application of CDA immunity. This note reviews three scholarly 
proposals and how each fails to solve a victim’s redress problem. The redress problem 
requires a novel approach to limit CDA immunity. This proposal, set forth in 
Appendix A, presents the best method to provide victims with redress, while keeping 
certain protections in place for social networking platforms and their users.
 The first proposal addresses the unmasking problem. Nathaniel Gleicher presents 
a uniform standard for courts to consider when addressing an unmasking request that 
balances the First Amendment interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.128 Gleicher’s 
standard involves four elements,129 which add to the central factors of unmasking 
standards—notice and a prima facie showing by the plaintiff—third-party notice 
requirements and the explicit evaluation of factors courts previously considered 
125. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 28, at 66–71, 185.
126. Alexis Kleinman, Facebook Adds New Feature for Suicide Prevention, Huffington Post (Mar. 2, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/25/facebook-suicide-prevention_n_6754106.html. With this 
feature, a user suspected of considering self-harm is prompted with a notice and can choose to reach out 
to friends or suicide hotlines or receive tips on how to deal with suicidal thoughts. Id.
127. See Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet Playground, 30 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1641, 1643 (2009) (“Because of its accessibility,  .  .  . Internet content is often 
disseminated to a wide audience, thereby strengthening its impact.”).
128. Gleicher, supra note 19, at 362–63.
129. The four elements are as follows:
First, both the recipient of the subpoena and the plaintiff should make reasonable 
efforts to notify the defendant, including notice via the same medium used by the 
defendant to send or post the contested message. . . .
 Second, the court should evaluate the strength of the plaintiff ’s argument. . . .
 Third, the plaintiff shall demonstrate that each specific element of information 
sought by subpoena is necessary for the identification of the defendant, and that the 
defendant’s identity is central to the continuation of the plaintiff ’s case. . . . 
 Fourth, if the first three factors do not yield a clear outcome, the court should 
balance the parties’ interests, giving preference to the party whose hardships and First 
Amendment interests are greater.
 Id. at 363.
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implicitly.130 However, despite lessening the challenge victims would face with a 
uniform unmasking standard,131 the proposal fails to solve the need for additional 
redress beyond the individual aggressor to properly make a victim whole.132
 Another proposal by Cara J. Ottenweller returns judicial focus to the traditional 
common law tort of defamation by interpreting § 230 to provide ISPs only qualified 
immunity.133 Under this proposal, an exception to immunity would treat a provider 
as a distributor, holding it liable for failure to remove defamatory content if it knows 
or has reason to know of the defamatory material.134 This exception returns to 
Stratton Oakmont ’s landscape, which holds ISPs liable as distributors, and recognizes 
that Congress never intended the CDA to grant blanket liability to ISPs.135 However, 
Ottenweller’s proposal falls short by providing a broad definition of “distributor,”136 
creating a grey area for courts to find that social networking platforms do not qualify 
and thus leave them immune to a victim’s claims.137
 Finally, Bradley A. Areheart proposes a practical solution to combat cyberbullying 
with a notice-based liability scheme.138 His proposal adopts the DMCA process,139 in 
which upon receiving particularized notice,140 an ISP must disable or remove 
offensive content (or have the user remove it) or risk liability.141 Areheart claims the 
proposal creates economic incentives for ISPs to be sensitive to user complaints and 
to ensure that they have mechanisms in place to respond to takedown requests.142 
However, this fails to solve the redress problem many victims face because it only 
addresses ISPs, not social networking platforms and the growth of cyberbullying 
130. Id. Additionally, Gleicher claims this proposal is bifurcated to provide stronger protection for speech 
targeting public figures and to protect speech on matters of public concern. Id. at 363–64.
131. See supra Part II.A (discussing the haphazard application of unmasking standards and the resulting 
uncertainty).
132. See, e.g., supra Part II.B (discussing that whether or not a uniform unmasking standard existed at the 
time of Zeran, AOL’s inability to identify Zeran’s individual aggressor would still leave Zeran without 
available redress).
133. Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1326.
134. Id. at 1327, 1330.
135. Id. at 1329.
136. A distributor would be defined as “any person or entity that delivers or transmits information  .  .  . 
through the Internet . . . without exercising editorial control over the information.” Id. at 1328.
137. According to Ottenweller, if an ISP takes editorial control and screens for harmful content, the CDA 
would preclude ISP liability. Id. at 1332. This leaves open judicial findings that social networking 
platforms, by screening for offensive content either before or after notice, could remain immune.
138. Areheart, supra note 7. Areheart recognizes that “victims currently lack meaningful redress, but 
modestly reforming ISP immunity could give them effective options.” Id. at 42.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012).
140. Areheart, supra note 7, at 46. If notice is not sufficient, the ISP may remain immune. Id. Areheart 
argues that this caveat limits incentives for ISPs to over-comply with takedown requests. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 47.
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thereon.143 This note adopts a modified version of Areheart’s proposal, extending it 
to such social platforms and providing recommended language for such a process.
 Congress passed the DMCA in 1998 just two years after adopting § 230, 
establishing a takedown procedure144 that requires ISPs to perform the very activities 
the Zeran court feared.145 Specifically, the DMCA grants immunity to service 
providers146 from copyright infringement claims if the provider falls under its safe 
harbor provisions.147 The provisions grant providers immunity for not knowing that 
copyright material stored on its network is infringing, or for removing or disabling 
access to the material quickly upon learning of its infringement.148 Apparently, 
Congress felt confident in a provider’s ability to review and respond to such notices.
 Although both the CDA and the DMCA divert from established levels of liability 
for offensive content,149 the CDA’s safe harbor grants immunity for nearly all providers, 
while the DMCA’s safe harbor limits liability for qualified providers.150 Congress 
narrowly limited immunity under the DMCA, reasoning that case law on secondary 
liability for copyright infringement is evolving and cannot fit within traditional 
vicarious liability standards.151 Similarly, cyberbullying on social networking platforms 
is evolving and does not fit within the traditional legal framework.152 Therefore, the 
DMCA properly addresses an uncertain area of law without granting blanket 
immunity, instead drawing clear procedures for limiting liability.
 The proposal requires amending the CDA to include a new section or passing a 
standalone statute specific to cyberbullying on social networks. Unlike Ottenweller’s 
approach, this proposed process is nearly identical to the DMCA’s process: A 
platform shall not be liable for cyberbullying without actual knowledge or awareness 
of the activity.153 If a platform receives notice of cyberbullying, or obtains knowledge 
or awareness on its own, it must either immediately remove the content or disable the 
creator’s account. Similar to the DMCA, if notice of cyberbullying is not sufficiently 
particularized, the platform may not be liable for failing to remove the content. 
143. See supra note 11 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 123; see also Patchin, supra note 123.
144. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
145. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
146. Under the DMCA, a “service provider” is defined as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or 
providing of connections of digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A), and “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator 
of facilities therefor,” Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
147. Id. § 512(c)(1).
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
150. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 18–19, 36–37 (1998).
151. See Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 233, 249–50 (2009).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 85–99.
153. For the full proposal, see infra Appendix A.
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Designated agents review notices to determine particularity, but if identifying 
cyberbullying requires further investigation,154 the content is temporarily removed. 
Upon further investigation, if an agent determines no cyberbullying occurred, the 
content is re-posted and the platform receives immunity (as it would under § 230).
 The benefits of this process far outweigh any drawbacks. First and foremost, 
victims obtain the ability to hold accountable an additional, easily identifiable entity. 
Specifically, the victim has the ability to seek redress from the social media platform 
instead of trying to unmask hers or the anonymous aggressor’s identity through the 
lengthy and complex unmasking process.155 To address congressional concerns 
regarding liability for third-party generated content,156 this process properly immunizes 
platforms from claims when specific remedial steps are taken. For example, like the 
DMCA’s safe harbor provisions,157 the proposal immunizes a platform if it “responds 
expeditiously to remove the claimed cyberbullying material or to disable the account of 
the user posting the claimed cyberbullying material.”158 Additionally, the notice process 
does not unduly burden platforms,159 considering that many currently have employees 
reviewing user requests for content removal.160 In fact, contrary to the concern expressed 
by the Fourth Circuit in Zeran that notice-based liability “would deter service providers 
from regulating the dissemination of offensive material,”161 platforms are incentivized 
to take notices seriously and to act expeditiously to mitigate harm.162
 The proposed solution also considers First Amendment concerns regarding the 
right to speak freely online.163 Under the CDA, a provider can remove or block 
speech protected under the First Amendment whether or not it receives a request for 
154. See Goldman, supra note 2 (discussing the differences between bullying and normal conflict). 
155. The proposal attempts to circumvent the need to unmask an anonymous cyberbully entirely. The proposal 
seeks to provide what the current legal landscape does not—redress for the victim and an identified entity 
to hold liable. If the social networking platform fails to adhere to the DMCA-like notice, the victim can 
hold it liable. Of course, the platform may invoke indemnification found in its terms of use and require 
that the anonymous cyberbully defend it against the victim’s claims. Even in such an event the victim, in 
the weaker position, is not faced with the burden of unmasking the bully—it is in the hands of the 
platform that already knows identifiable information about the anonymous individual.
156. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012).
158. Infra Appendix A.
159. Further, the process fairly burdens victims and platforms by requiring particularized notice and prompt 
review.
160. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
161. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Any efforts by a service provider to 
investigate and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory 
material more frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves 
to further possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation.”).
162. According to Areheart, a DMCA-like scheme is the “first step in requiring [platforms] to take a more 
involved role in addressing torts in cyberspace.” Areheart, supra note 7, at 47.
163. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. Areheart also addressed First Amendment objections in 
his proposal:
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removal.164 Alternatively, free speech receives stronger protection under the proposal 
by requiring platforms to make a determination as to whether the speech is harmful, 
based on the review of a detailed notice before removal.165 Under the proposal, a 
designated Reviewing Agent reviews a detailed Notif ication of Claimed 
Cyberbullying intended to adequately provide the Agent with sufficient knowledge 
of whether the content is cyberbullying or potentially protectable free speech.166
 Another aspect of this DMCA-like solution highlights the unique functions of 
social networking platforms to combat First Amendment objections. Scholars note 
that restoring liability for user-generated content involves a trade-off,167 one that would 
eliminate user comments on online platforms to avoid any possible liability.168 However, 
such a hypothetical cannot logically extend to social networking platforms. In their 
most basic form, they essentially require user-generated content to operate; there would 
be no Facebook without profiles and no Twitter without tweets.169 While such 
objections may bear on other online community forums, the proposed notice-based 
liability scheme would not stifle user-generated content on social networking platforms 
beyond proscribing harmful speech.
[I]mposing liability only for actual knowledge would limit collateral damage to 
protected forms of speech by not providing any incentive or requirement for ISPs to 
police the Internet. . . .
 . . . ISPs, like newspapers, obtain economic benefits by providing a forum for highly 
controversial material that will make it worth the risks to continue to do so in the 
future. Accordingly, First Amendment concerns may well be over-stated.
 Areheart, supra note 7, at 45.
164. See Ottenweller, supra note 20, at 1323 (“The very wording of the statute suggests that Congress gave 
ISPs the green light to remove or block offensive material, including instances of cyberbullying, even if 
such material would traditionally be protected by the Constitution. Therefore, the words used in the 
statute coupled with the actual purpose of the CDA suggests that the  Zeran  court placed too much 
weight on the policy of free speech on the Internet.”).
165. Additionally, free speech on social networking platforms can be distinguished from speech historically 
protected under the First Amendment. See Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-
Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1213, 1235 
(“Not only is Internet speech ever-present but one can also quickly and easily disseminate its content to 
an infinite number of people. This situation stands in stark contrast to f lyers, posters, newspapers, 
speeches, and other traditional forms of expression that reach a far more limited audience and exist in a 
particular time and place.”).
166. See infra Appendix A. 
167. See Choi, supra note 121, at 536.
168. See id. (“Reforming section 230 to restore intermediary liability for user-generated defamation would 
pressure websites to adopt corresponding restrictions that limit their exposure to risky user behavior.”); id. 
at 536 n.138 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Press in the Digital Age: The Future of Free Expression 
in a Digital Age, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 427, 436 (2009) (“If I were liable for comments posted in response to my 
blog posts, I simply would not allow any comments. The same is true for online versions of newspapers and 
magazines . . . . Without section 230, many website operators would simply disable these features.”)).
169. See Jonathan Strickland, How Facebook Works, HowStuffWorks (Dec. 10, 2007), http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/internet/ social-networking/networks/facebook.htm; Jonathan Strickland & Nathan 
Chandler, How Twitter Works, HowStuffWorks (Dec. 17, 2007), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/
internet/social-networking/networks/twitter.htm.
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 A final benefit of the proposal is its practical approach that avoids conflict with 
the CDA and avoids overturning settled case law. Specifically, the proposal runs 
alongside the CDA, acting as an exception to § 230 immunity, and leaves case law 
intact. This approach requires platforms—those in the best position to stop the 
harm—to promptly remove the content, a function many already perform.170
 Adopting a DMCA-like solution to address cyberbullying is appropriate because 
the values embodied in the DMCA ref lect those in the CDA. In both statutes, 
Congress sought to protect the freedom and operation of the Internet.171 Additionally, 
the DMCA’s takedown process—and similarly, the process proposed in this note—
mirrors the policy underlying § 230 that online platforms hosting user-generated 
content do not have the burden to police content violations.172 The proposed solution 
effectively furthers the freedom of the Internet without requiring any additional 
action from social networking platforms beyond the procedures Congress expressly 
provided for in the DMCA.173 Therefore, it is both practical and logical to apply the 
framework of the DMCA to provide adequate redress to victims of cyberbullying.
V. CONCLUSION
 The unmasking and immunity problems contribute to the intertwining web of 
laws and precedent that unfairly eliminates a victim’s ability to hold social networking 
platforms accountable. This landscape forces victims to face aggressors head-on, 
decreasing the adequacy of available redress and unfairly burdening victims. The 
redress problem not only affects victims, it also affects legal traditions, public policy, 
and society. Under the proposed DMCA-like process, platforms risk appropriate 
liability for failing to mitigate the cyberbullying problem, providing the best solution 
that balances the interests of victims, users, and platforms. This process may not 
singlehandedly end cyberbullying, but it addresses the situation better than does the 
current legal landscape.
170. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
171. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012) (stating that one of several policy considerations listed under subsection 
(b) is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 49 
(1998) (“Information location tools are essential to the operation of the Internet; without them, users 
would not be able to find the information they need.”).
172. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“Congress made a considered policy determination that the ‘DMCA notification procedures [would] 
place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material 
and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007))); see also H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing how § 230 was meant to overrule the burden 
set forth in Stratton-Oakmont that Internet content providers may be liable for failing to remove content 
created by third-party users).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (requiring service providers, upon gaining knowledge of allegedly 
infringing content, to “expeditiously” remove the content in order to receive the statute’s Good 
Samaritan protections).
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APPENDIX A
DMCA Provisions174 Proposed Cyberbullying Provisions
“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary 
relief, injunctive or other equitable relief, . . . for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage 
at the direction of a user of material that resides on 
a system or network controlled or operated by or for 
the service provider, if the service provider—
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the 
material or an activity using the material on the 
system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not 
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, 
acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity . . . ; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as 
described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to, the material that 
is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity.”175
(1) Platform Liability. A social networking 
platform176 shall not be liable for monetary relief, 
injunctive relief, or other equitable relief, for 
cyberbullying activity177 submitted and posted on the 
platform’s system or network or on an application 
controlled or operated by the platform, if the 
platform—
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge of the 
cyberbullying activity on the platform’s system or 
network;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is 
not aware of facts or circumstances from which 
cyberbullying activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, 
acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material.
(B) upon Notification of Claimed Cyberbullying, 
set forth below, the platform responds expeditiously 
to remove the claimed cyberbullying material or to 
disable the account of the user posting the claimed 
cyberbullying material. 
(2) Platform Review. All social networking 
platforms shall have at least one designated 
Reviewing Agent who is a direct employee of 
the platform, responsible for the review of all 
Notifications of Claimed Cyberbullying. Platforms 
without a Reviewing Agent waive any immunity 
granted herein.
“(3) Elements of notification.—
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a 
notification of claimed infringement must be a 
written communication provided to the designated 
agent of a service provider that includes substantially 
the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person 
authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to  
have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at 
a single online site are covered by a single notification, 
a representative list of such works at that site.
(3) Elements of Notification.
Social networking platforms must have in place 
and available to all users a standard Notification 
of Claimed Cyberbullying submission form that is 
immediately submitted to the platform’s Reviewing 
Agent(s) and includes substantially the following—
(A) An electronic signature of the individual 
reporting the cyberbullying activity, where the 
reporting individual need not be a user of the 
platform or the victim or intended target of the 
claimed cyberbullying material;
174. Id. § 512.
175. Id. § 512(c)(1).
176. “A social platform is a Web-based technology that enables the development, deployment and 
management of social media solutions and services. It provides the ability to create social media websites 
and services with complete social media network functionality.” Social Platform, Techopedia, https://
www.techopedia.com/definition/23759/social-platform (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
177. For the definition of cyberbullying for this note and proposal, see supra note 2.
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(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed 
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity and that is to be removed or access to 
which is to be disabled, and information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the 
material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the service provider to contact the complaining 
party . . . . (v) A statement that the complaining 
party has a good faith belief that use of the material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the 
notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, 
that the complaining party is authorized to act on 
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is 
allegedly infringed.”178
(B) A URL link, screen shot, or otherwise 
identifiable evidence of the claimed cyberbullying 
activity that allows a Reviewing Agent to readily find 
the cyberbullying activity and the username of the 
content creator;
(C) Information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the platform or its Reviewing Agent to contact the 
complaining party;
(D) A statement that specifies with sufficient 
particularity the complaining party’s good faith belief 
that the cyberbullying activity is a violation of the 
platform’s terms of use and is not intended for light-
hearted humor;
(E) A statement that the information provided in the 
Notification is accurate and, if determined to be false, 
acknowledges the platform’s ability to disable the 
complaining party’s access to the platform.
“(1) No liability for taking down generally.—
Subject to paragraph (2), a service provider shall 
not be liable to any person for any claim based on 
the service provider’s good faith disabling of access 
to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be 
infringing or based on facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent, regardless 
of whether the material or activity is ultimately 
determined to be infringing.
(2) Exception.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply . . . 
unless the service provider—
(A) takes reasonable steps promptly to notify the 
subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to 
the material;
(B) upon receipt of a counter notification . . . , 
promptly provides the person who provided 
the notification . . . with a copy of the counter 
notification, and informs that person that it will 
replace the removed material or cease disabling access 
to it in 10 business days; and
(C) replaces the removed material and ceases 
disabling access to it not less than 10, nor more than 
14, business days following receipt of the counter 
notice . . . .”179
A social networking platform shall not be liable to 
any person for any claim based on the platform’s 
good faith removal of cyberbullying activity, or 
the disabling of a party’s account, based on the 
Notification of Claimed Cyberbullying, regardless of 
whether the content is ultimately determined to be 
cyberbullying activity. If a Reviewing Agent cannot 
reasonably determine whether the reported material 
is cyberbullying activity, the Reviewing Agent or the 
platform must remove the claimed cyberbullying 
activity and immediately conduct an investigation. If 
the material is determined not to be cyberbullying 
activity, the platform must immediately re-post the 
material but is not liable for the initial removal.
“(m) Protection of privacy.—Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to condition the 
applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on—
(1) a service provider monitoring its service or 
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing 
activity . . . .”180
(m) Protection of privacy.
A social networking platform shall not be required 
to monitor its system or network or affirmatively 
seek facts indicating cyberbullying activity unless 
the platform or its Reviewing Agent(s) have actual 
knowledge of, or have received a Notification of, 
specific cyberbullying activity.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
179. Id. § 512(g)(1)–(2).
180. Id. § 512(m).
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